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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"established aberration," 50 the exemption of professional baseball from
the antitrust laws. It is doubtful that the courts will be confronted
with challenges to the legality of perpetual player control clauses,
nor will they have to berate Congress for its "positive inaction." 51 The
door is open to arbitration governed by the principles of federal labor
law. Methods of player control must be resolved by the Club Owners
and the Players Association through negotiation. For baseball to con-
tinue in its present format, these negotiations must be expeditious and
characterized by goodwill. Unfortunately, the past performance of the
parties at the bargaining table does not bode well for the future. 52
Should an air of hostility prevail, fanned by the exercise of the
parties' "lock out" and "strike" privileges, entire seasons may pass
without significant competition. The greatest loss would then be
suffered by the fans.
TIMOTHY P. BEAVERS
Local Government-CONCEPT OF IMPACT FEES UPHELD BUT REsTRIC-
TIONS IMPOSED ON SCOPE OF THE FEE AND USE OF FUNDS.-Contractors
& Builders Association v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
For the first time, the Supreme Court of Florida has established the
authority of municipalities to impose charges in the nature of impact
fees.' In May 1972, the City of Dunedin, Florida, enacted ordinances
which imposed fees for new water and sewer connections. 2 The charges,
supplementary to the actual cost of connection into the water and sewer
systems, were collected "to defray the cost of production, distribution,
transmission and treatment facilities for water and sewer provided at the
expense of the City of Dunedin. . . ."3 Local contractors and the Con-
50. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
51. Id. at 283. Over fifty bills concerning the relationship of baseball to the anti-
trust laws have been introduced in Congress; none has passed. Id. at 281.
52. For example, the Club Owners exercised their power to "lock out" the players
from training camps and thus threatened a delay in the 1976 season's schedule. The
season began on time and after six months of intense negotiations both parties agreed
to a modified form of the reserve system. But the. perpetual control issue is still
unsettled.
1. Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
2. Id. at 316-17 nn.l-3.
3. The Dunedin ordinance requires an $800 total charge for sewer and water conne-
tions for each dwelling or business unit. 329 So. 2d at 316-17 nn.1 & 2.
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tractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against the imposition of these fees.4 The circuit
court enjoined collection, but the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, finding the ordinances "valid and enforceable." 5 The decision
was certified by the district court as a question of great public interest
and was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. While the supreme
court found the ordinances invalid because they lacked sufficient re-
strictions on the use of the revenue, the court did uphold the charges
"in principle."6
Crucial to this decision was the court's finding that the Dunedin
ordinances exacted a user charge and not a tax. 7 Traditionally, munici-
pal revenue has come from three sources: taxes, special assessments, and
user charges.8 The supreme court accepted the reasoning of the district
court, finding the fees "analogous to fees collected by privately owned
utilities for services rendered."9 If the supreme court had classified the
fees as a tax, they would have been impermissible because Florida's
constitution permits municipalities to levy only ad valorem taxes or
such other taxes as have been authorized by general law. 10 The court
found that there was no such authorization in this case." Having classi-
fied the fees as user charges, however, the court held that the Dunedin
ordinances failed to meet the requirement that they be "just and equita-
able."12
The Florida Constitution grants municipalities the power to render
municipal services. 13 Chapter 180, Florida Statutes, which governs mu-
nicipal public works, does not expressly provide for financing of capital
expenditures other than through mortgage revenue certificates or
debentures;' 4 however, it does provide that a municipality may impose
"just and equitable rates or charges" for the use of utility services."
4. Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, Civil No. 73-827 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Pinellas County, Mar. 29, 1974).
5. City of Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763, 767 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
6. 329 So. 2d at 317-18.
7. Id. at 317.
8. See 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.03 (3d ed. 1970).
9. 329 So. 2d at 317.
10. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 9; City of Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n,
312 So. 2d at 766.
11. 329 So. 2d at 317.
12. Id.
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b), provides: "Municipalities shall have governmental,
corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to .. . render municipal services, and
may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law."
14. FLA. STAT. § 180.08 (1975).
15. Id. § 180.13(2).
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Traditionally, municipal spending has been supported in part by
deficit financing, with utility revenues repaying municipal debentures. 16
The core of the impact fee concept is that the expense of expanding
municipal or county services is immediately passed on to the user. The
term impact fee distinguishes between the traditional minimal water
and sewer connection charges and those fees created to meet the fi-
nancial burdens of community growth. Because Florida is experiencing
extraordinary growth from natural population increase and migration,I
an increasing number of communities are adopting impact fee ordi-
nances.'
Traditionally, the cost of expanding capital service facilities was
borne by the community population as a whole, the capital cost being
amortized over several years and all users sharing in its cost.' 9 Impact
fees, however, isolate and charge the new user as the initiator of the
expansion.2 0 The Dunedin impact fee ordinances required that the new
user immediately help defray the capital cost of that user's addition to
the system and thereafter contribute toward maintenance and replace-
ment as part of the community. The court found that the charges im-
posed were an acceptable alternative to the more traditional method
of deficit financing.21 Although amortization of a water and sewer bond
issue may be administratively simpler, having current capital available
can be advantageous and is perhaps a necessity in light of the recent de-
cline of investor confidence in municipal bonds. 22
Only two reported Florida cases dealing with a form of impact fee
16. See generally 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 39.03, 39.17 (3d ed.
1970).
17. Florida's rank among the states in population has continuously increased. Ranked
27th in 1940, Florida was 20th in 1950, 10th in 1960, and 9th in 1970. BUREAU OF Busi-
NESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1975,
at 24 (9th ed. 1975). There was a 78.7% increase in population from 1950 to 1960 and a
37.1% increase from 1960 to 1970. Id. In 1974, Pinellas County, where Dunedin is located,
ranked as the third most populous county in Florida. Id. at 27. Pinellas County gained
over 127,000 residents in the period 1970 to 1974, a gain solely attributable to net migra-
tion rather than natural population increase because deaths exceeded births. Id. at 26. In
1970, the population of Dunedin was 17,639; it was estimated to be 23,660 in 1974. Id. at 22.
18. See, e.g., Clearwater, Fla., Ordinance 1452 (May 7, 1973); Tallahassee, Fla., Ordi-
nances 74-0-1424 (June 25, 1974) and 75-0-1484 (Oct. 14, 1975). The Clearwater ordinance
specifically designates the charge imposed as an "impact fee." The fee is imposed on all
new buildings at the time of final inspection, and all revenue collected is placed in a
special account to be used only for road construction, public transit facilities, and storm
drainage. The Tallahassee ordinances impose a "systems charge" on new users to fund a
water and sewer line extension and depreciation fund to meet expansion costs.
19. See generally 12 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 35.37f (3d ed. 1970).
20. See Contractors and Builders Ass'n v, City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 318.
21. Id. at 319.
22. See id. at 320.
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are apposite here, and both decisions have held the fees to be invalid.
Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood 23 dealt with a surcharge to a
building permit fee consisting of one percent of the estimated cost of
construction. The revenue was to be used for development of recrea-
tional parks and open space, a use unrelated to the building permit
fees. The circuit court declared the charges discriminatory and an
unauthorized tax.2 4
Broward County v. Janis Development Corp.2 5 concerned a county
ordinance which imposed a land use fee assessed when building permits
were issued. The ordinance provided for a scaled fee which increased in
proportion to the intensity of land use on the theory that higher density
development imposed a greater burden on the community. 6 The rev-
enue was earmarked for construction and improvement of roads, streets,
highways, and bridges. The appellate court found the fee to be an im-
proper tax enacted without statutory authorization but did not con-
sider whether the impact fee was discriminatory.2 7
Although there is no prior Florida case upholding an impact fee,
there is precedent in other jurisdictions. Courts in Illinois,2 8 Indiana,-
Oregon,3 0 and Utah3 1 have upheld similar sewer connection fees as per-
missible user charges. Those courts approved charges when there was a
direct relationship between the fee assessed and the service rendered.3 2
The Florida Supreme Court cited these decisions to support its con-
clusions. The Dunedin fees were distinguished from the invalid taxes
of Janis and Venditti-Siravo because the latter were collected for pur-
poses unrelated to the capital utility costs incurred by the city.33 The
23. 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1973).
24. Id. at 122-23.
25. 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'g Janis Development Corp. v. City
of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1973).
26. The text of the ordinance appears at 311 So. 2d at 372 n.1.
27. Id. at 375. See 40 Fla. Supp. 41, 60 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1973). In effect, the
circuit court found the issues of constitutionality and taxing authority to be a single issue.
Id. at 55.
28. Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary Dist., 177 N.E.2d 214 (Ill. 1961).
29. Brandel v. Civil City of Lawrenceburg, 230 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. 1967).
30. Hayes v. City of Albany, 490 P.2d 1018 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971).
31. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo City, 503 P.2d 451 (Utah 1972).
32. The fees in Venditti and Janis, in contrast, bore no direct relationship to the sub-
sequent expenditures and could not be user charges. New construction creates direct and
indirect expenses for local government. There are the direct costs of utility connections
and roads to the site. Indirect costs may include increased demand upon all roads, schools,
and recreational facilities. Since the out-of-state cases all involved sewer connection fees, it
was easy for the Dunedin court to see a relationship between the charge and the benefit
conferred. See 14 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.02 (3d ed. 1970).
33. 329 So. 2d at 318. The court found no direct relationship between enforcement of
the building code and the increase in building permit fees, since the revenues were used
for roads and parks.
1977)
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
court, quoting from the Supreme Court of Illinois in Hartman v.
Aurora Sanitary District 4 stated that "such reasonable charges have
been uniformly sustained as a service charge rather than a tax."3
While upholding the authority of a municipality to obtain capital
for future expansion through increased connection charges, the
Dunedin court imposed certain restrictions on the use of moneys col-
lected.3 6 The court found that differential utility rates-those which
distinguish between categories of users-were permissible but that such
rates must still be "just and equitable."3 7 More specifically, the court
stated that the cost of new facilities should be borne by new users only
to the extent that additional use requires new facilities A The cost of
original capitalization and of subsequent replacement must be borne
by old and new users alike.39 Thus, the court required that all moneys
collected under an ordinance such as Dunedin's must be used to meet
costs of expansion and for no other purpose.4 0 Applying these principles
to the Dunedin ordinance, the court concluded that "the whole burden
of supplementary capitalization" was impermissibly placed upon the
new users.4'
The court also required that such revenue-producing ordinances set
forth explicit restrictions on the use of the fees collected, citing the
ordinance involved in Hayes v. City of Albany"2 as an example.4 3 That
ordinance restricted the use of connection fee revenue to meeting
emergency repairs and expanding existing facilities.4
While the Dunedin decision does give municipalities the authority
to impose user charges, nowhere does the supreme court employ the
term "impact fee," even though state newspapers publicized the de-
cision using this term.45 Moreover, there is no indication that costs of
expansion of other services may be specifically assessed to new users.4 6
34. 177 N.E.2d 214 (Il1. 1961).
35. 329 So. 2d at 318 n.4.
36. Id. at 320-21.
37. Id. at 320.
38. Id. at 321.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Id. at 321.
42. 490 P.2d 1018 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971).
43. 329 So. 2d at 321.
44. Id.
45. See St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 26, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 1; Tallahassee Democrat,
Feb. 26, 1976, at 33, col. 1.
46. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida has approved a
Jacksonville water pollution control charge levied on all new users of the city's sewerage
system after the effective date of the act. Charges collected are placed in a separate fund
for construction, extension, and replacement of sewerage treatment plants and pumping
stations. Ivy Steel and Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701 (M.D.. Fla. 1975).
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The emphasis upon the relationship between the charge and the benefit
indicates that it might be more difficult to gain judicial approval of
assessments for expansion of such services as roads, parks, and libraries,
which do not lend themselves to accurate individual assessment.
While giving judicial approval to differential treatment between
past and present population sources, the Dunedin court pointed out
that the ordinance did not deny equal protection of the laws.4 7 That
issue was raised at the circuit court level in both Jan iS48 and Venditti.49
The circuit court in Janis concluded that impact fees were an unsatis-
factory solution and that a comprehensive plan was needed to cope with
growth problems."0 The appellate court, on the other hand, found that
implementation of impact fees was a legislative function and declined
to rule on constitutionality. 5'
47. 329 So. 2d at 317 n.2. The equal protection issue was also raised before the federal
district court in Ivy Steel and Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701 (M.D. Fla.
1975). The court held that the assessment of a water pollution control charge against new
users had a rational basis and did not violate the equal protection clause as "every regula-
tion, every charge, every tax must have a beginning." Id. at 703.
48. 40 Fla. Supp. 41 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1973).
49. 39 Fla. Supp. 121, 122 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1973).
50. 40 Fla. Supp. at 58.
51. 311 So. 2d 371, 375-76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The Florida Legislature has
considered authorization of impact fees. The 1974 session adopted a concurrent xesolution
expressing the state's concern with a policy on growth, and there is a section specifically
dealing with impact costs. [1974] 1 Fla. Laws 1344 (Committee Substitute for H.R. Con.
Res. 2800). It provides in part:
Growth, through the influx of new residents and new construction, may impose
increased costs on local government in providing essential services and facilities.
Local government, whether seeking to stem or to encourage growth, should not
place the brunt of these increased costs on present residents but rather may require
the new residents and new construction to contribute an equitable share toward
meeting these costs.
State and local government shall review the budgets of the local governmental
units, including the state revenue sharing, to insure that the tax revenues, charges,
and fees collected are allocated equitably between old and new facilities. Considera-
tion shall be given to accepting fees in kind in lieu of impact costs.
Pursuant to these considerations, state and local government shall identify these
costs of increased residents and new construction and shall develop an appropriate
policy regarding their equitable allocation. State and local government shall also
identify the benefits of increased residents and new construction, to the end that
decisions about growth may be made on a more factual, rational basis.
Id. at 1346.
In addition, legislation was proposed to grant broad powers in local governments to
impose impact fees that would "better enable the several counties and municipalities of
this state to accommodate orderly growth and development within their jurisdictions by
providing them with a method of meeting increased costs." Fla. H.R. 837 (1976). That
bill provided that the costs of essential public facilities and services be "more fairly borne
by the owners of new construction and development who make these additional costs neces-
sary, rather than placing the brunt of these costs on owners of existing construction." Id.
at 2. The proposed legislation granted counties and municipalities the authority to collect
1977]
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The Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the Dunedin ordinances
is significant in the area of growth policy. For the community unit, the
growth issue has two related facets-regulation and financing.52 Over
the past fifty years the zoning power has become an effective regulatory
tool.53 Financing of community growth has been accomplished through
property taxes, special assessments, and subdivision exactions. 54 Impact
fees are a further attempt to cope with the fiscal aspect of increased
population. At the same time these fees may have the effect of regulat-
ing growth. Impact fees will raise the cost of housing to some extent,
old as well as new.55 This in turn will possibly inhibit migration.56
Thus, impact fees could have an exclusionary effect.
a tax defined as an impact fee, the revenues from which would have been used for streets,
parks, police and fire protection, hospitals, public housing, public transit, libraries and
recreation facilities. Id. at 3-4. H.R. 837 died in committee at the end of the 1976 legisla-
tive session, as did two other impact fee proposals, H.R. 86 and 743 (1976).
52. The two facets are interrelated. For example, in the context of an exclusionary
zoning case, one court has pointed out that
The motivations of exclusionary zoning practices are deeply embedded in the
nature of suburban development. In part these practices are motivated by fear of
the fiscal consequences of opening the community to all social and economic classes.
Residents of the municipality anticipate that higher density development will re-
quire the construction of additional roads, sewers, and water systems, the provision
of additional municipal services, and the increase of school expenditures, all of
which must be financed through local property taxes.
Southern Burlington City NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J.
1975) (concurring opinion).
53. Since the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), zoning has become more wide-
spread, complex, and effective. A recent New York case demonstrates how sophisticated the
exercise of planning under the police power has become. In Golden v. Planning Bd. of
Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), the Court of
Appeals of New York upheld a timed development ordinance spanning a period of 18
years. See Southern Burlington City NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975); Jimmerson & Campbell, Cities Fight to Stem Population Growth: Constitu-
tional Crisis From Ramapo to Petaluma, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 313 (1975);
Johnston, Developments in Land Use Control, 45 NoTRE DAME LAw. 399 (1970).
54. See Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119
(1964).
55. In Dunedin the fees are to be paid by the builder at the time of issuance of the
building permit. Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 316-17
n.l. The builder is unable to recoup any of that expenditure until the house is con-
structed and sold. The builder must charge the buyer $800 plus some normal rate of
return on his investment. The buyer, however, will more than likely finance his purchase
through a down payment and a mortgage. For example, if the buyer pays 10% of the total
purchase price as a down payment, the Dunedin ordinance would increase the down pay-
ment by $80 (10% x $800 "impact fee" = $80), plus some normal rate of return on the
builder's invesitment. There would also be an increase in the monthly mortgage payment
of the buyer. If the price of newly constructed houses rises, the demand for lower priced
older housing will increase, thereby causing the price of older homes to rise.
56. Evans and Vestal, Local Growth Management: A Demographic Perspective,
[V.I. 5
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If, in fact, impact fees should be found absolutely prohibitive of
growth, the chance they would be struck down is great. Current de-
cisions indicate that the judiciary will tolerate varying degrees of
growth control short of absolute prohibition.57 Communities around
the nation are permitted to regulate the timing, nature, and quantity
of growth. For example, the Court of Appeals of New York has sus-
tained use of a timed development program for expansion over an
eighteen-year period of time.58 The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of a village ordinance excluding residences other than
one-family units occupied by traditional families or not more than
two unrelated persons. 9 Recently, attention has been focused upon
the California case, Construction Industry Association v. City of Peta-
luma.60 The Petaluma plan provided for a slow rate of expansion of
municipal services-slower than the natural rate of growth would
provide. A restricted number of building permits were to be issued,
matched to the slow rate of expansion of municipal services. The plan,
designed to inhibit anticipated increases in population, was held un-
constitutional in the trial court6' but upheld on appeal.62
Presently, there has been no conclusive demonstration that impact
fees slow migration, impede growth, or have a prohibitive effect; there
is, however, an increasing recognition of the need for empirical research
in this area. 63 Thus, it is likely that Florida courts will have to deal
more substantially with the issue of impact fees in the future. In the
meantime, the Supreme Court of Florida has joined the ranks of the
farsighted portion of the bench in recognizing the need to find solu-
tions to the problems caused by rapid population growth.
PAMELA HOTINE ESPENSHADE
55 N.C. L. REv. 421, 428 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d
291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
58. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
59. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
60. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
61. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
62. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
63. See Evans and Vestal, supra note 56.

